The Zion Economy
A Tenth of All Their Interest: Designing a Zion Economy That Actually Works
What would it take to build a community with “no poor among them” without compulsion, without crushing the families who join it, and without draining the very wealth that is supposed to lift the poor?
Every Latter-day Saint who reads the Doctrine and Covenants carefully eventually runs into the same unsettling question: we were told to become “equal in earthly things,” to have “no poor among” us, and to pay “one-tenth of all their interest annually.” What would that actually look like on a spreadsheet? Not as a sermon, and not as a utopia. I mean as a working system that a real congregation of real families, with mortgages and businesses and retirement accounts, could live inside a modern economy.
This post is my attempt to answer that question. I start with the scriptures the idea rests on. Then I lay out the system as briefly as I can, compare it with some historical attempts, and run the numbers for an ordinary family and a very wealthy one. After that I go into the design details and compare the system with Norway, the Mondragón cooperatives in Spain, and China. Last, I take up a thoughtful alternative reading from the Zion Blueprint channel, which holds that the tithe should be 10% of a person’s entire net worth every year.
- The principles: scriptures the idea rests on
- The system in one box (and two tiers)
- How it compares with earlier attempts
- Real-life math: an average family vs. a wealthy family
- The system in detail
- Norway, the Nordics, Spain, China, and the U.S. in detail
- The Zion Blueprint view, fairly considered
- A workable synthesis, and questions for discussion
1. The Principles: What the Scriptures Actually Say
Surplus first, then a tenth of “interest”
The revelation that defines tithing for Latter-day Saints was given at Far West, Missouri, on July 8, 1838. It has two distinct steps:
“Verily, thus saith the Lord, I require all their surplus property to be put into the hands of the bishop of my church in Zion, for the building of mine house, and for the laying of the foundation of Zion and for the priesthood, and for the debts of the Presidency of my Church. And this shall be the beginning of the tithing of my people. And after that, those who have thus been tithed shall pay one-tenth of all their interest annually; and this shall be a standing law unto them forever, for my holy priesthood, saith the Lord.”
Notice the word change. Verses 1 and 5 speak of “surplus property.” Verse 4 does not say “a tenth of their property.” It says “one-tenth of all their interest.” Whatever “interest” means, the revelation seems to treat it as something different from the property already handled in verse 1.
What did “interest” mean in 1838?
Noah Webster’s American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) gives several meanings of the noun. Two of them matter here:
“2. Share; portion; part; participation in value. He has parted with his interest in the stocks. He has an interest in a manufactory of cotton goods.”
“4. Premium paid for the use of money; the profit per cent derived from money lent, or property used by another person…”Webster’s 1828 Dictionary, “Interest” (noun)
Webster also lists “5. Any surplus advantage.” So the word could mean either an ownership stake or the return produced by property. Both readings were live in 1838, and much of this post is about what follows from each one.
Consecration and stewardship
The 1831 “law of the Church” set out how consecration was supposed to work: a family consecrated its property and then received back a stewardship big enough to support it.
“And behold, thou wilt remember the poor, and consecrate of thy properties for their support that which thou hast to impart unto them, with a covenant and a deed which cannot be broken.”
“…every man shall be made accountable unto me, a steward over his own property, or that which he has received by consecration, as much as is sufficient for himself and family.”
“…the residue shall be kept in my storehouse, to administer to the poor and the needy…”
The phrase “sufficient for himself and family” is the scriptural root of what I will call the sufficiency baseline. Verse 33 calls whatever is “more than is necessary for their support” a “residue,” and verses 34–36 send that residue to the storehouse for the poor, for “purchasing lands for the public benefit of the church,” and for building up Zion.
Stewardship, abundance, and the rich made low
“For it is expedient that I, the Lord, should make every man accountable, as a steward over earthly blessings, which I have made and prepared for my creatures. I, the Lord, stretched out the heavens, and built the earth, my very handiwork; and all things therein are mine. And it is my purpose to provide for my saints, for all things are mine. But it must needs be done in mine own way; and behold this is the way that I, the Lord, have decreed to provide for my saints, that the poor shall be exalted, in that the rich are made low. For the earth is full, and there is enough and to spare; yea, I prepared all things, and have given unto the children of men to be agents unto themselves.”
Verse 18 warns that anyone who takes “of the abundance which I have made, and impart not his portion” will “lift up his eyes in hell.” Two ideas sit side by side in this passage. One is equalization: the poor are exalted and the rich are made low. The other is abundance: “enough and to spare.” Any design that delivers only one of them has missed half the revelation.
The same section also describes how the treasury of the United Firm was supposed to work. It was to receive “all moneys that you receive in your stewardships, by improving upon the properties” (D&C 104:68). The Church’s own footnote glosses the related word “avails” as “profits, or proceeds.” And D&C 82 describes stewards improving their talents so that the gains go to a common store:
“And you are to be equal, or in other words, you are to have equal claims on the properties, for the benefit of managing the concerns of your stewardships, every man according to his wants and his needs, inasmuch as his wants are just— And all this for the benefit of the church of the living God, that every man may improve upon his talent, that every man may gain other talents, yea, even an hundred fold, to be cast into the Lord’s storehouse, to become the common property of the whole church— Every man seeking the interest of his neighbor, and doing all things with an eye single to the glory of God.”
Equality as a spiritual requirement
“That you may be equal in the bonds of heavenly things, yea, and earthly things also, for the obtaining of heavenly things. For if ye are not equal in earthly things ye cannot be equal in obtaining heavenly things.”
“Nevertheless, in your temporal things you shall be equal, and this not grudgingly, otherwise the abundance of the manifestations of the Spirit shall be withheld.”
The models: Jerusalem, Enoch, and the Nephites
“And the multitude of them that believed were of one heart and of one soul: neither said any of them that ought of the things which he possessed was his own; but they had all things common.”
“And the Lord called his people Zion, because they were of one heart and one mind, and dwelt in righteousness; and there was no poor among them.”
“And they had all things common among them; therefore there were not rich and poor, bond and free, but they were all made free, and partakers of the heavenly gift.”
Law by force and law by covenant
One more principle shapes everything that follows. Scripture repeatedly separates a lesser law that a people can actually live from a higher law that requires a united, willing heart. Ancient Israel received the law of Moses as a schoolmaster before the fuller law of Christ. In 1834, after the Saints in Missouri failed to live consecration, the Lord explained why Zion could not yet be redeemed:
“But behold, they have not learned to be obedient to the things which I required at their hands, but are full of all manner of evil, and do not impart of their substance, as becometh saints, to the poor and afflicted among them; and are not united according to the union required by the law of the celestial kingdom; and Zion cannot be built up unless it is by the principles of the law of the celestial kingdom; otherwise I cannot receive her unto myself.”
The same revelation puts the full program off: “let those commandments which I have given concerning Zion and her law be executed and fulfilled, after her redemption” (D&C 105:34). Four years later came section 119, which the Church’s own section heading frames as the answer to how much the Lord required “of the properties of thy people for a tithing.”
I draw a practical lesson from this. Governments work by force. Taxes are collected whether we agree or not, and that is the proper domain of a “lesser law” that has to work for everyone, believer or not. Zion works by covenant. D&C 70:14 says equality must come “not grudgingly,” and you cannot compel a willing heart. So the design below has two tiers. In the outer tier, everyone lives under a civil system of graduated taxes and a public safety net. In the inner tier, a fully voluntary covenant community aims at real equality through consent.
2. The System in One Box
The two-tier “Tenth of the Increase” model, at a glance
Tier 1, the civil economy (mandatory). Everyone lives under a state-run system of graduated (progressive) taxation. It is a hybrid of market capitalism and Nordic-style social democracy: markets and private property stay, and progressive taxes fund a public safety net. This tier is enforced by law.
Tier 2, the covenant community (voluntary). Members pay their civil taxes like everyone else and then also live a higher law:
- Sufficiency baseline. Each family keeps what is “sufficient for himself and family” (D&C 42:32): a home, a car, the tools of its trade or business, and savings, up to roughly a regional median. In the U.S. that might be about $350,000 of net worth and $100,000 a year of income. Nothing below the baseline is touched.
- Consecrate the surplus as co-owned shares. Assets above the baseline are consecrated into a local community fund. The family keeps managing its stewardship (the business, farm, rental, or portfolio) and keeps partial title, but the fund becomes a co-owner.
- Pay a tenth of the increase. Each year the member pays 10% of the real increase (the gains or “interest”) on consecrated assets, plus 10% of income above the baseline. This is my reading of “one-tenth of all their interest annually.” It can be paid in kind, as shares, so that no one is forced to sell a farm or a business.
- Local funds, a light federation. Each fund serves 5,000–20,000 people, roughly a stake-sized community or a local bishop’s storehouse. The money and its administration stay local. A coordinating body sets standards, audits, pools risk, offers investment guidance, and provides a disaster backstop, but it does not hold or control the money.
- An endowment spending rule. Each fund invests for the long term, spends no more than about 3–3.5% of its value per year on the poor, welfare, and community enterprise, and reinvests the rest. Norway’s oil fund is governed by a similar rule.
- Member lending. Members can borrow from their fund at member rates, under conservative credit-union-style limits. Kirtland taught that lesson the hard way.
- Freedom to leave. Withdrawal is allowed under transparent rules. It has community consequences (for example, not serving in certain offices of trust), but no civil penalty.
3. A Short Comparison with Earlier Attempts
The early United Order (1831–1834). Under Bishop Edward Partridge in Missouri, members deeded property to the Church and received stewardships back. The United Firm, organized in 1832 to run the Church’s mercantile and publishing work, was disbanded in 1834 (see the headings to D&C 78 and 104). Persecution, debt, and what D&C 104 calls “covetousness and feigned words” all played a part. One lesson: a system that depends on unusual virtue from every participant every year is fragile.
Brigham City and Orderville. Starting in the mid-1860s, Lorenzo Snow led the Brigham City cooperative, a joint-stock network of community enterprises that became a model for later cooperatives. Orderville, founded in 1875, went much further toward full communal living. It grew to roughly 700 people, with common meals and enterprises, before disbanding in 1885 under the pressure of the federal anti-polygamy campaign and internal strain. Brigham City’s shareholding approach, where people kept ownership stakes, sits closer to what I propose than Orderville’s full pooling.
The Kirtland Safety Society (1837). This is a cautionary tale. The Church-related bank operated without a state charter, had thin hard-currency reserves, and collapsed in 1837 during the nationwide Panic of 1837, leaving investors with heavy losses. The design lessons: keep leverage low, keep reserves high, keep lending conservative, and never let a community’s faith in its leaders substitute for sound balance sheets.
Mondragón (Spain). This is the most successful modern example of a faith-inspired cooperative economy. It was founded in 1956 by young engineers guided by a Catholic priest, Fr. José María Arizmendiarrieta. Each worker-member holds an individual capital account, at least 10% of profits go to an education and social fund, and a cooperative bank (now Laboral Kutxa) recycles savings into new co-ops. Its federated structure is the closest real-world match to my proposal: many self-governing local co-ops, with shared institutions on top.
The Zion Blueprint reading. This holds that “interest” means one’s entire ownership stake, so members would pay 10% of total net worth every year with no baseline. I treat it in detail in section 7, because it is the sharpest alternative to my own view.
4. Real-Life Math: An Average Family vs. a Wealthy Family
Here are three illustrative households. Assumptions: a 5% real return on assets, a sufficiency baseline of $350,000 net worth and $100,000 income, and, in my version, 10% of the real increase on assets above the baseline plus 10% of income above the income baseline (counted once, so investment income is not double-counted).
My version: net worth $300k < $350k baseline → $0; income $80k < $100k → $0
Zion Blueprint (10% of net worth): 0.10 × $300,000 = $30,000/yr = 37.5% of income
Traditional income tithe: 0.10 × $80,000 = $8,000/yr
A family whose only real asset is a paid-off $400,000 home would owe $40,000 a year under a 10%-of-net-worth rule, half its gross income, on an asset that pays no cash at all.
Surplus assets: $2,000,000 − $350,000 = $1,650,000
Tithe on increase: 10% × (5% × $1,650,000) = 10% × $82,500 = $8,250
Tithe on income above baseline: 10% × ($250,000 − $100,000) = $15,000
My version total ≈ $23,250/yr (9.3% of income; 1.2% of net worth)
Zion Blueprint: 10% × $2,000,000 = $200,000/yr (80% of income)
Income tithe: $25,000/yr
Surplus assets: $100,000,000 − $350,000 = $99,650,000
Tithe on increase: 10% × (5% × $99,650,000) = 10% × $4,982,500 ≈ $498,250
If the $5M income is mostly that same investment return → total ≈ $0.50M (no double count)
If the $5M is salary/business pay on top of the assets → add 10% × $4.9M = $490,000 → ≈ $0.99M
Zion Blueprint: 10% × $100,000,000 = $10,000,000/yr (200% of income)
Income tithe: $500,000/yr
How this compares with what Americans already pay (rough estimates)
For context, here is a very rough estimate of what each household might pay today in a high-tax state like California, counting federal income tax, state income tax, payroll taxes, and property tax for a married couple filing jointly. The top federal rate is 37%. California’s top rate is 13.3%, which includes a 1% surcharge on income over $1 million. High earners also pay the 3.8% Net Investment Income Tax. California’s Proposition 13 sets the base property tax at 1% of assessed value. For comparison, Massachusetts has a flat 5% income tax plus a 4% surtax on taxable income above $1,107,750 (2026). These are approximations, not tax calculations.
| Household | Est. current U.S./CA taxes | % of income | % of net worth | My covenant tithe | 10% of net worth |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Average ($80k / $300k) | ≈ $15k–18k | ≈ 19–23% | ≈ 5–6% | $0 | $30,000 |
| Upper-middle ($250k / $2M) | ≈ $75k–85k | ≈ 30–34% | ≈ 4% | ≈ $23,250 | $200,000 |
| Wealthy ($5M / $100M) | ≈ $2.0M–2.7M | ≈ 40–54% | ≈ 2–2.7% | ≈ $0.5M–1.0M | $10,000,000 |
A member’s combined burden: civil taxes plus covenant
Under the two-tier design, a covenant member pays both tiers. A non-member pays only the civil tier. Using the rough California figures above as a stand-in for the civil tier:
| Household | Non-member: civil only | Member: civil + covenant | Member total, % of income | Member total, % of net worth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Average | ≈ $16.5k | ≈ $16.5k + $0 | ≈ 21% | ≈ 5.5% |
| Upper-middle | ≈ $80k | ≈ $80k + $23k = $103k | ≈ 41% | ≈ 5.2% |
| Wealthy | ≈ $2.0M–2.7M | ≈ $2.5M–3.7M | ≈ 50–74% | ≈ 2.5–3.7% |
Three things stand out. First, the average family’s burden does not rise at all, and it gains access to a second safety net. Second, the wealthy member pays a lot as a share of income, but still only a few percent of wealth per year, well below the roughly 5% real return the assets earn. The family’s wealth keeps growing. Third, the two safety nets complement each other. Public programs remain the floor for everyone. Covenant welfare can respond faster, more personally, and with work and dignity attached, and over time it may reduce members’ reliance on public assistance, which lightens the civil burden for everyone else too.
5. The System in Detail
The core math problem with a 10%-of-net-worth tithe
The heart of the matter is simple arithmetic. If you pay 10% of your total assets every year, your assets have to earn enough to replace that 10% just to stand still:
W × (1 + r) × 0.90 = W → 1 + r = 1/0.9 → r = 11.1% real per year
Few asset classes earn 11% real over long periods. At a more realistic 5% real:
After 10 years: (1.05 × 0.90)^10 = 0.945^10 ≈ 0.568 → about 57% remains
Half-life: ln(0.5) / ln(0.945) ≈ 12.3 years
For assets that earn nothing in cash (a home, a car, savings at zero real interest):
0.90^10 ≈ 0.349 → about 35% remains after 10 years
To be fair, the net-worth model does not literally make everyone destitute. A family that keeps working and saving reaches a steady state where new savings exactly offset the annual tithe:
W(next) = 0.945 × W + S → W* = S / 0.055
Saving $20,000/yr at 5% real → W* ≈ $363,600
So it works less like a poverty machine and more like a wealth ceiling, set at about 18 years of a household’s savings.
But that ceiling falls hardest on exactly the people the scriptures most want to protect. Asset-rich, cash-poor households get hit first: retirees living off a paid-off home, farmers whose land is worth millions but earns 2–3%, and young families whose only wealth is home equity. A rancher with $3 million of land earning 2% real would owe $300,000 a year against $60,000 of income.
It is also important to see where the money goes. It does not vanish. It moves to the storehouse. If members pay in shares, the community fund ends up owning a growing slice of everything:
Share transferred after 10 years: 1 − 0.90^10 ≈ 65.1%
After 20 years: 1 − 0.90^20 ≈ 87.8%
Read this way, a 10%-of-net-worth tithe is really a path to gradual communalization, closer to Orderville or a Hutterite colony than to a tithe. Whether the community as a whole gets richer or poorer then depends entirely on how well the storehouse invests and how fast it spends.
Why a tenth of the increase works
Under my reading, the tithe never touches principal. A consecrated asset earning 5% real pays 0.5% of its value to the fund each year, and the family’s stake still grows at 4.5% real. Both the family and the fund grow. That is how “the poor shall be exalted, in that the rich are made low” can sit alongside “there is enough and to spare”: the rich grow more slowly relative to the community, the fund grows steadily, and nobody’s seed corn gets eaten.
Consecrated surplus X grows at 5% real; fund receives 10% of the increase = 0.5% of X per year
Fund earns 5% real and spends ≤ 3.5% → fund grows ≈ 1.5%/yr real before inflows
Example community of ~10,000 people with X = $100M of consecrated surplus:
Year 1 inflow = $500,000; Year 30: X ≈ $375M, fund ≈ $36M, welfare budget ≈ $1.2M/yr
With a one-time $10M seed at founding: fund ≈ $52M, welfare ≈ $1.7M/yr by year 30
For comparison, if the same community paid 10% of net worth into a fund with the same spending rule, the fund would grow much faster (to roughly $207M by year 30) and spend more on welfare (about $7M a year by then). But members’ private stakes would fall from $100M to about $18M, and total community wealth (private plus fund) would reach only about $225M, versus about $411M under the tenth-of-increase rule. The net-worth rule redistributes faster. The increase rule builds more total abundance. That is a real trade-off, and I think it is honest to name it.
The increase rule’s welfare budget starts small. That is why the one-time consecration of surplus in D&C 119:1 matters. Seeding each fund with a gift at founding, or having members consecrate a portion of their surplus outright when they join, gives the storehouse working capital from day one.
Why local, and why 5,000–20,000 people?
The scriptures place the storehouse with “the bishop” and speak of orders that “do their business in their own name” (D&C 104:49–50). A fund serving 5,000–20,000 people, roughly stake-sized, is a sweet spot:
- Big enough to diversify and staff professionally. With tens of millions of dollars, a fund can hold a diversified portfolio, hire a competent part-time investment committee and auditors, and absorb a few large welfare cases without strain.
- Small enough for accountability. At this size, people who know the needy by name still make welfare decisions. Anthropologist Robin Dunbar’s often-cited figure of about 150 meaningful relationships roughly matches a ward, where ministering happens. A stake-scale fund aggregates a few dozen such communities, still close enough that board members live among the people they serve.
- Federated, not centralized. A light coordinating body sets accounting and audit standards, runs mutual reinsurance between funds (so a flood or factory closure in one town is shared), publishes investment guidance, and maintains a disaster backstop. It holds no pooled money and cannot direct a local fund’s investments.
Governance, valuation, and liquidity
- Transparent books. Each fund publishes annual audited statements to its members. Directors serve fixed terms, are sustained by common consent (D&C 104:71 requires “the voice and common consent of the order” for withdrawals from the treasury), and recuse themselves from decisions involving their own families or businesses.
- Valuing private businesses and land. Publicly traded assets are easy to value. A dental practice or a cattle ranch is not. Use a simple, conservative method agreed in advance (for example, a three-year average of net income times a standard multiple, or an independent appraisal every few years), and tithe realized increase plus a modest imputed return. That avoids paying on paper gains that may never materialize.
- Paying in kind. A farmer short on cash can transfer an additional fractional interest to the fund instead. The fund becomes a slightly larger silent partner, never a forced seller.
- Leverage limits (the Kirtland lesson). Funds should hold meaningful reserves, cap member lending at a modest share of assets, require collateral, and never borrow heavily themselves. Credit unions offer a well-tested template.
Incentives and the opt-out
A good design rewards stewardship. Under the increase rule, a family that doubles a business’s output keeps 90% of the gain. That is a strong incentive to work, unlike a rule that confiscates wealth faster than most assets can grow. The baseline protects the young and the struggling. And because the fund co-owns surplus rather than taking it outright, a family that leaves can be paid out its own share under pre-agreed rules: perhaps over several years, at appraised value, minus whatever the family has already tithed. Leaving carries community consequences, such as stepping out of certain offices of trust, but no civil penalty. That is the difference between covenant and coercion.
Advantages and risks of the two-tier approach
Advantages: It preserves freedom of conscience, since no one is compelled to live a religious law. There is no coercion beyond ordinary civil taxes. There is a real right of exit. And it does not depend on persuading the whole nation: a single stake or community can start tomorrow, inside today’s laws, and prove the concept on a small scale.
Risks:
- Free-riding. People may join when they need help and leave when they prosper. A waiting period for full welfare eligibility, a simple record of contributions, and exit rules that settle up fairly all help.
- Drifting out in good times. Communal experiments have often eroded as members grew prosperous. Fourth Nephi records the same pattern: once the people became “exceedingly rich,” “they did have their goods and their substance no more common among them” (4 Nephi 1:23–25). Mild contributions and a growing, visible fund make staying attractive.
- The double burden. Members pay civil taxes and covenant contributions. The baseline, the after-tax option, and possible charitable deductions keep this bearable.
- Legal structure. In the U.S. this might mean a 501(c)(3) charity for the welfare arm (so gifts can be deductible and benefits go strictly by need), plus a cooperative or LLC-style mutual fund that holds the co-owned investment shares, with member capital accounts in the Mondragón style. Exit and buy-out rules must be written into binding operating agreements, because courts generally enforce clear contracts and seldom enforce vague religious expectations. (Canada’s Supreme Court, in Hofer v. Hofer (1970), upheld a Hutterite colony’s rule that departing members had no claim on colony property, a reminder that exit terms should be explicit and fair from the start.) A securities attorney should review any arrangement that pools investment assets.
6. Detailed Comparisons: Norway, the Nordics, Spain, China, and the U.S.
Norway and the Nordics: Tier 1-style social democracy
Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global is the world’s best-known endowment run by a state. The government’s entire net cash flow from petroleum goes into the fund. Under the fiscal rule adopted in 2001, withdrawals for the budget are meant to follow the fund’s expected real return over time. That was set at 4% at first and lowered to 3% in 2017. In normal years the government aims to spend somewhat less. The 2027 budget proposal plans withdrawals of about 2.7% of the fund’s value, covering roughly a quarter of central government spending. On September 30, 2026, the fund was valued at about 22,014 billion kroner, on the order of US$2 trillion depending on the exchange rate.
Two lessons transfer directly. First, spend only the return, never the principal, and the fund serves generation after generation. Second, a spending rule that is written down and publicly watched resists political raids. The big differences are that Norway’s fund is a single national fund, filled by a natural resource and governed by the state. My proposal uses many local funds, filled by members’ voluntary increase and governed by covenant communities.
The Nordic countries more broadly show what a Tier 1 hybrid looks like: market economies with strong property rights and high, broad-based taxes funding universal services. According to the OECD, 2024 tax revenue was about 45.2% of GDP in Denmark, 41.4% in Sweden, and 40.2% in Norway, against 25.6% in the United States and an OECD average of 34.1%. That is “social democracy” achieved by law. It does reduce poverty a great deal, but it does not aim at, and cannot compel, the heart-level equality of D&C 70:14.
Spain: Mondragón, a voluntary federation
Mondragón grew from a single workshop founded in 1956 into a federation of 81 self-governing cooperatives. In 2025 it reported about €11.3 billion in sales and an average workforce of about 71,400, making it the Basque Country’s largest employer. Each member’s share of profits is credited to an individual capital account. By cooperative rules, at least 10% of surplus goes to an education and social fund and a significant share goes to collective reserves. Its cooperative bank, Laboral Kutxa, recycles local savings into local enterprise. Mondragón is a voluntary community operating inside a market economy and a Spanish tax system, which is exactly the two-tier shape I am describing. Its federation of local co-ops with shared financial institutions is the closest real-world analogue to many local funds with a light coordinating layer.
Other voluntary communities inside market economies
Hutterite colonies in Canada and the northern U.S. practice near-total community of goods based on Acts 2 and 4. A 2024 count found about 58,400 Hutterites in 544 colonies. Colonies typically split when they reach roughly 125–150 people, a striking real-world echo of the Dunbar scale. Israeli kibbutzim were once fully communal. Today only a few dozen remain fully cooperative. Most have become “renewed” kibbutzim that pay differential salaries but tax members’ incomes progressively to fund an internal safety net. That is, in effect, a voluntary graduated tithe inside a national tax system.
China: equality goals pursued by force
China offers the opposite design: a state that claims the goal of shared prosperity and pursues it through state ownership and central control. Urban land is owned by the state and rural land by collectives. Households and firms hold long-term land-use rights rather than freehold title, and many major industries are dominated by state-owned enterprises. The personal income tax is progressive from 3% to 45% on wages and other comprehensive income, while interest, dividends, rent, and property-transfer gains are generally taxed at a flat 20%. There is no broad annual tax on owner-occupied homes. Revenue leans heavily on value-added tax (about RMB 6.7 trillion of 17.5 trillion in tax revenue in 2024). Local governments have also relied on sales of land-use rights (about RMB 4.9 trillion in 2024). Personal income tax brought in about RMB 1.64 trillion in 2025, roughly 9% of tax revenue and on the order of 1% of GDP. China shows that centralized ownership does not by itself produce equality, and that a system without consent leaves no room for the “not grudgingly” of D&C 70:14.
The United States
The U.S. relies heavily on progressive income taxes: a top federal rate of 37%, state rates up to 13.3% in California, the 3.8% Net Investment Income Tax, and Massachusetts’ 4% surtax on income over $1,107,750 (2026). Property taxes are local, and California’s base rate is 1% of assessed value. Its big gap is unrealized gains. Wealth that grows without being sold is not taxed, and it can be borrowed against, a point the Zion Blueprint presenter rightly raises.
| Feature | Two-tier Zion model (covenant tier) | 10% of net worth (Zion Blueprint) | Norway / Nordics | Mondragón | China | U.S. / California |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base | Real increase on surplus above baseline + income above baseline | Total net worth, no baseline | Broad income and consumption taxes; oil fund return | Cooperative profits | VAT, corporate tax, land-use sales; PIT on wages | Income (realized), payroll, property |
| Who pays most | The wealthy, in proportion to their gains | Asset-rich households, including cash-poor ones | Broad middle class plus high earners | Members, in proportion to work and capital | Consumers (VAT); wage earners | High earners on income |
| Effect on the poor | Pay nothing; receive local welfare | Pay little; receive more welfare | Strong universal safety net | Job security; social fund | Mixed; regressive VAT | Safety net weaker than Nordics |
| Effect on the rich | Grow more slowly; never lose principal | Wealth capped and shrinks toward a ceiling | High income taxes; some wealth taxes (e.g. Norway) | Pay ratios compressed | Capital income at flat 20% | Unrealized gains untaxed |
| Sustainability | High: principal never touched | Low for private wealth; depends on storehouse | High: spend ≈ expected return | Proven since 1956 | Strained by property slump | Persistent deficits |
| Growth of common fund | Steady (≈1.5% real + inflows) | Very fast (most wealth transfers) | Fast (oil inflows + return) | Reserves + capital accounts | State assets and SOEs | No common fund |
| Role of state vs. community | State: Tier 1 taxes; community: local covenant funds | Local bishops, per presenter | State-run | Federated co-ops | Central state and party | Federal/state/local governments |
| Voluntariness | Fully voluntary, with exit | Voluntary covenant (as proposed) | Mandatory | Voluntary membership | Mandatory | Mandatory |
7. The Zion Blueprint View, Fairly Considered
In “The Greatest Abomination in the LDS Church Today: God’s Economy, Zion Paper #5”, the Zion Blueprint channel, presented by author Keith R. Kelsch (papers at zionpapers.com), argues that “interest” in D&C 119:4 means an ownership stake. Adding up all of one’s stakes gives net worth, so the standing law is to pay a tenth of one’s net worth every year, with no baseline. In his words, the annual tithe “restrains excessive accumulation,” and “the true law of tithing is meant to return all interest back to God over time.” He contrasts the rich and poor house: “Tithing income actually grinds the faces of the poor,” while a tithe on interest “equalizes sacrifice as the Lord intended,” fulfilling D&C 104:16. He is emphatic that this is not a political ideology (“This is Zion. It’s a completely different thing”), and he insists the surplus goes to the local bishop rather than a centralized treasury. He also points to Alma 13:15, where Abraham “paid tithes of one-tenth part of all he possessed.”
What he gets right. I think he is correct on several important points:
- Equity. A flat income tithe really does weigh more heavily on a renting family of six than on a wealthy single investor. Measuring ability to pay by wealth, not just income, is a serious insight.
- Rich and poor. He takes D&C 104:16 seriously as an economic mechanism, not just a metaphor.
- Local control. His insistence on local bishops and local stewardship matches the federated, 5,000–20,000-person design I propose.
- The borrowing loophole. His critique of the wealthy borrowing against untaxed, unrealized gains is accurate and important, and my system closes the gap by tithing the real increase whether or not it is sold.
Where the math breaks. When he raises the obvious objection himself (“I will soon have nothing”), the video refers viewers to Zion Papers #4–6 rather than working the numbers on screen. The numbers are what they are: assets must earn about 11.1% real just to break even. At 5% real, a family keeps 57% after ten years. A paid-off home keeps 35%. Paid in shares, about 65% of everything passes to the storehouse within a decade. That may be a coherent vision of Orderville-style communalization, but it is not compatible with a family keeping a stewardship “sufficient for himself and family” (D&C 42:32). Nor does it fit “there is enough and to spare,” unless the storehouse invests brilliantly and spends sparingly.
A textual note. D&C 119 has two steps. Verse 1 takes all surplus property once. If verse 4 then meant “a tenth of all property, every year,” it would be odd for the revelation to change words from “property” to “interest.” Read alongside D&C 104:68 (moneys received “by improving upon the properties”) and D&C 82:18 (gaining “other talents… to be cast into the Lord’s storehouse”), the most natural reading of “interest,” to me, is what the stewardship produces: Webster’s “premium” or “surplus advantage.” Abraham’s tithe in Alma 13:15 reads naturally as a one-time tenth of his possessions, which parallels the one-time surplus consecration of verse 1. Still, the brother is reading Webster honestly, and readers can weigh the texts for themselves.
The video also makes strong historical claims about how tithing teaching changed after 1844. I leave those aside here. My purpose is to evaluate the economic mechanism, not to pass judgment on Church leaders past or present.
8. A Workable Synthesis
Put the pieces together and a design emerges that honors both halves of D&C 104: the poor exalted and enough and to spare.
- Two tiers. A civil economy with graduated taxes and a public safety net for everyone, by law. Inside it, a voluntary covenant community that aims at real equality by consent.
- A sufficiency baseline, so no family is taxed out of its home, farm, or tools.
- Surplus co-owned with a local fund, so the rich are “made low” relative to the community through shared ownership rather than confiscation.
- A tenth of the increase, paid in cash or shares, so principal is never consumed and everyone’s stewardship keeps growing.
- Local funds of 5,000–20,000 people, federated for standards and risk-sharing, never centralized.
- An endowment spending rule (≤3–3.5%), so the storehouse serves this generation and the next.
- Conservative lending, audited books, common consent, and a fair exit, the lessons of Kirtland, Orderville, Mondragón, and the kibbutzim.
Over a generation, a fund like this would co-own a meaningful share of its community’s productive wealth. It would fund welfare permanently from returns alone, and it would make capital available to young families and new businesses on fair terms. None of that requires anyone to be destitute, and none of it requires the state. It only requires a group of people willing to be, as the revelation says, “every man seeking the interest of his neighbor.” And here “interest” carries both of Webster’s meanings at once.
Questions for discussion
- Does “interest” in D&C 119:4 mean ownership stake, increase, or both? What do verses 1 and 5 suggest?
- Where should the sufficiency baseline be set, and should it vary by region and family size?
- Is slower, sustainable equalization (tithe on increase) better than faster redistribution (tithe on net worth)? Why?
- Is 5,000–20,000 people the right size for a local fund? What would you want the coordinating layer to do, and never do?
- How should a covenant community relate to the civil safety net: complement, replace, or reduce dependence on it?
- What exit rules would feel fair both to a departing family and to those who remain?
- Could a single stake or community start a pilot today under existing law? What would the first step be?
Sources
- Doctrine and Covenants 42, 70, 78, 82, 104, 105, 119; Moses 7; 4 Nephi 1; Alma 13; Acts 4.
- Webster’s 1828 Dictionary, “Interest”.
- Zion Blueprint, “The Greatest Abomination in the LDS Church Today: God’s Economy, Zion Paper #5”; zionpapers.com.
- Norges Bank Investment Management, Q3 2026 results and fund value.
- Government of Norway, The Norwegian Fiscal Policy Framework; National Budget 2027 (Meld. St. 1, 2026–2027).
- OECD, Revenue Statistics 2025 (country notes for Denmark, Sweden, Norway, United States).
- Mondragón Corporation, About us and 2025 annual figures; Freundlich, “The Mondragon Cooperative Experience”; Whyte & Whyte, Making Mondragon.
- Ministry of Finance of the PRC, 2024 fiscal revenue and expenditure; State Taxation Administration, China Tax Annual Report 2025.
- Mass.gov, Massachusetts 4% Surtax on Taxable Income.
- Church History, The Kirtland Safety Society; Church History in the Fulness of Times, ch. 31; Utah Division of State History, The United Order Movement.
- Journal of Plain Anabaptist Communities, “Hutterite Population and Colonies, 2024”; The Canadian Encyclopedia, “Hutterites in Canada”.
- S. Getz et al., Cooperative kibbutzim, end-2024 survey (University of Haifa); Russell, Hanneman & Getz, The Renewal of the Kibbutz (Rutgers, 2013).
All projections are illustrative estimates using a 5% real return and simplified assumptions; actual returns, taxes, and legal requirements vary. This is not financial, tax, or legal advice. The views here are my own and do not represent The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.












It always amazes me how we can have hugely rich archeological history very close by that goes unsung and unvalued, while we all dream about seeing the more famous sites. You know what they say about prophets in their own land, and I guess that’s true about places as well; we don’t value those nearby.






















